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Historical background and theoretical 
framework of the alexithymia concept
The term alexithymia (Greek; a = lack, lex-
is = word, thymos = emotion, mood, or feel-
ing) was coined by Sifneos and introduced in 
the early 1970s to denote a cluster of  features 
including difficulty identifying and describing 
subjective feelings, a restricted fantasy life, 
and preoccupation with trivial aspects of  ex-
ternal events’ characteristics [1].
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Clinical observation of  alexithymia date 
back to the 1940s [2]. Alexithymic deficits 
were described in patients with classic psy-
chosomatic diseases as well as in general 
psychiatric patients,  particularly in those re-
sponding poorly to psychoanalytic therapy 
[3–6]. Reusch described affective and cogni-
tive disturbance due to developmental arrest 
in early childhood when emotions are not well 
connected with words and expressed through 
bodily channels [3], while Kelman associated 
externalized living as modus vivendi [6]. Mar-
ty and de M’Uzan’s [7] introduce a concept 
of  pensée opératoire (operative thinking), de-
noting the absence of  fantasy and other man-
ifestation of  the depleted inner mental world 
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of  feelings, ideas about intentions, needs, at-
titudes and focused on external events. They 
also suggested a vulnerability to somatic ill-
ness. Marty [8, 9] attributed it to a deficien-
cy in mentalization – a concept introduced 
in the early 1960s. Almost simultaneously, 
Krystal independently described similar ob-
servations among patients with substance use 
disorders and posttraumatic states [10, 11]. 
Krystal first highlighted alexithymia as possi-
bly the most critical single factor diminishing 
the success of  psychoanalysis [12]. Rubins 
emphasized that Horney was the first to label 
these patients as alexithymic [5, 13]. McDou-
gall referred to these individuals as normo-
paths, dis-affected and anti-analysands, and 
she warned of  prolonged periods of  stag-
nation in therapy [14–16]. In 1967 Sifneos 
reported his preliminary observations on 
some patients’ distress from psychosomatic 
illnesses [16]. He recognized that they have 
no pathology of  conflict as neurotic patients 
have, but rather show deficits in the abil-
ity to experience feelings. In the subsequent 
three years, Nemiah and Sifneos conducted 
a more systematic examination of  previous-
ly tape-recorded interviews of  patients with 
two of  the following classic psychosomatic 
diseases specified by Alexander (duodenal 
ulcer, bronchial asthma, rheumatoid arthri-
tis, ulcerative colitis, hypertension, hyperthy-
roidism, and atopic dermatitis) [17–19]. Their 
conclusion was that these patients have diffi-
culty in describing and identifying their feel-
ings. Also, many of  these patients showed a 
thought content consistent with the concept 
of  pensée opératoire. In the seminal publica-
tion, Nemiah, Freyberger, and Sifneos fully 
explicated core features of  alexithymic indi-
viduals [20]. The year 1976 was defining for 
the alexithymia construct, when it was se-
lected as the central theme of  the 11th Euro-
pean Conference on Psychosomatic Research 
in Heidelberg, Germany. At the meeting, Sif-
neos told attendees that ‘The word was sim-
ply used to describe certain clinical observa-
tions that were made over very many years. I 
tried appropriately to use a Greek word or a 
pseudo-Greek word for descriptive purposes’ 
[21]. Alexithymia engulfs a disturbance in af-
fective and cognitive functions and is char-
acterized by a difficulty recognizing and ver-
balizing feelings, and a paucity of  fantasy [1]. 
Nemiah and colleagues made the distinction 
between emotions and feelings [21]. Emo-
tions have the neurophysiological component 
and the component of  motor-expression of  
affect. Both components must have mental 
representations before the conscious experi-
ence of  feelings [20]. More recently Damasio 
emphasized the same conceptual distinction 
and highlighted that emotions precede feel-
ings [22]. Sifneos and Nemiah pointed out 
that alexithymia is not an absence of  emo-
tions, but rather a deficit in elaborating feel-
ings [16]. Nemiah, Freyberger and Sifneos 
also reported that ‘Although many individuals 
may initially speak of  being nervous, or sad, 
or angry, if  they are pressed to describe their 
feelings further and to tell the examiner what 
being sad or nervous or angry feels like, it rap-
idly becomes apparent that they are totally un-
able to do so’ [20]. Many psychoanalysts and 
psychotherapists observed that those patients 
are deficient in specific psychological capaci-
ties and do not respond well to traditional in-
terpretative psychotherapies [5, 6, 23]. 
Lack of love, joy, and happiness
We can imagine an alexithymic person as 
an individual who lacks psychological mind-
edness, demonstrates a minimal interest in 
play and has concreteness in dreaming and 
thinking; someone who has limited aware-
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ness of  emotions and drives, and a utilitarian 
style of  living, whose behavior is guided by 
rules instead of  inner feelings, fantasies, and 
wishes. When attending psychoanalytic ther-
apy, an alexithymic individual fills the session 
with a monotonous chronological recital of  
external events and is unable to engage in psy-
chotherapeutic therapy, provoking feelings of  
dullness and boredom in the therapist. Hence, 
it is very likely that alexithymia will be associ-
ated with less improvement in psychotherapy 
[24]. The alexithymic individual has a limited 
ability to experience pleasurable emotions 
such as joy, love, and happiness [25, 26]. Krys-
tal conceptualized the course of  maturation 
of  emotions as a progressive desomatisation 
also linked to learning of  words and subse-
quently differentiated into different subjective 
feelings [27]. Furthermore, the failure to link 
feelings with fantasies and to reflect on inner 
experience pushes the mind toward a preoc-
cupation with the details of  external events, 
which is characteristic of  pensée opératoire 
[28]. With alexithymia, the emotions are still 
felt, but the connections with words and im-
ages are interrupted, the emotions are poorly 
represented at higher levels of  consciousness, 
resulting in a deficit of  conscious feelings and 
difficulties in identifying and verbalizing feel-
ings. It is likely that individuals with difficulty 
identifying, verbalizing, and reflecting on feel-
ings would be inclined to greater emotional 
arousal in response to emotional stimuli [29]. 
Individuals with alexithymic deficits can have 
outbursts of  sadness or rage, which may seem 
to be at odds with the definition, but they 
have no understanding of  these strong emo-
tional expressions [30].
Alexithymia and the concept of mentalization
During the 1960s in an attempt to un-
derstand the role of  pensée opératoire in 
psychosomatic illness, the French psycho-
somatic school introduced the concept of  
mentalization [8, 9, 31]. During the 1990s, 
Lecours and Bouchard extended the contri-
butions of  Marty and other French analysts 
by proposing a hierarchical conceptual mod-
el with levels of  mentalization which shows 
some similarities to Krystal’s theory of  af-
fects and Lane and Schwartz’s hierarchical 
model of  levels of  emotional awareness [28, 
32, 33]. It was around that time when Fonagy 
and Target adopted the concept of  mental-
ization and defined it more broadly as the ca-
pacity to think about one’s own and others’ 
mental states regarding feelings, desires, and 
intentions [34, 35]. More recently, Fonagy, 
Bateman and Luyten described mentaliza-
tion as a multifaceted construct with cogni-
tive and affective components and indicated 
that mentalizing is not granted and  constant 
capacity of  the mind, but is in constant flux 
and dynamic and interplay context of  specif-
ic attachment relationships is also influenced 
by the level of  distress in specific moments 
[36]. According to Taylor and Bagby the way 
that Fonagy understands  mentalization [36], 
and the way Lane applies it, is very different 
from how it was conceptualized originally by 
French psychoanalysts [8, 9, 23, 31, 36, 37]. 
Lane and colleagues argue that scientific de-
velopments since the 1970s, including the 
concept of  ‘theory of  mind’ or mentaliza-
tion, make it essential to expand the alexi-
thymia concept [38]. He permits a shift to a 
perspective that difficulty in verbalizing is the 
indicator, not the cause of  the problem. Van-
heule and colleagues also have highlighted 
that alexithymia is an indicator of  an under-
lying process [39, 40]. While Taylor, Bagby, 
and Parker argue that alexithymia does not 
embrace the cognitive aspects of  broad men-
talization construct, the authors of  this paper 
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see externally oriented thinking as a teleologi-
cal stance which is a developmental stage in 
mentalization [41]. Teleological stance/mode 
is extreme exterior focused thinking in which 
only observable change or action is consid-
ered to be a valid indicator of  the intentions 
of  others [42]. Lane and colleagues report 
that the Levels of  Emotional Awareness 
Scale (LEAS) correlated positively with some 
measures of  ‘theory of  mind’, which is not 
the case with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
[37]. Some individuals with a high degree of  
alexithymia might be impaired in their ability 
to read the intentions, desires, and emotional 
states of  others, but measures of  alexithymia 
were not designed to assess this ability [43]. 
Several researchers have found associations 
between alexithymia and poor empathic abili-
ties, which is consistent with clinical observa-
tions and suggests that impaired empathy is a 
correlate of  alexithymia [28,44–46]. 
Dimensional or categorical construct?
While Lane and colleagues proposed 
two subtypes of  alexithymia anomia (lack 
of  words for emotions) and agnosia (not 
knowing one’s emotions), Primmer suggest-
ed various degrees of  alexithymia [37, 47]. 
The concept of  affective agnosia is a cue 
that alexithymia is not merely a difficulty in 
finding words for feelings, but involves a de-
ficiency in the mental representation of  emo-
tions [37]. Contrary to Nemiah and Sifneos, 
Krystal regarded alexithymia as a dimension-
al construct and reported that ‘Most patients 
are able to experience some feelings some of  
the time’ and stated that alexithymia is not 
an ‘all or nothing’ manifestation [28]. It is 
possible that the same individuals with alexi-
thymia might express fluctuations in their 
level of  emotional awareness and they shift 
back and forth on the continuum between af-
fective agnosia and anomia proposed by Lane 
and colleagues [37]. Following Krystal’s ideas 
about the impact of  trauma on affect devel-
opment and affect regression, the degree of  
alexithymia in a person is likely to reflect the 
extent of  trauma experienced by the person 
during childhood or as an adult, and whether 
or not an attachment figure was available to 
contain and modulate the person’s distress 
[48]. Contemporary theory and research of  
alexithymia suggest continuous rather than 
categorical approach, as it often includes trait 
and state components alike [37, 47, 49–52]. 
The empirical results of  different studies 
provided substantial finding for viewing alex-
ithymia as a dimensional construct, as well as 
findings from several different taxometric in-
vestigations [23, 50, 51]. 
Primary versus secondary alexithymia
A distinction between primary and sec-
ondary alexithymia was made in the last cen-
tury [53]. Primary alexithymia was thought to 
reflect ‘structural or neurobiological defects’ 
and secondary or acquired alexithymia was 
seen as emerging from ‘developmental ar-
rests or from a catastrophic environmental 
onslaught’, or a reaction to life-threatening 
illness or medical treatment [25, 54]. Second-
ary alexithymia is thus amenable to change 
when the medical illness or life setting im-
proves [55–57]. Taylor, Bagby, and Parker 
have pointed out that alexithymia is the name 
of  the multifaceted construct, and regardless 
of  etiology, is not only a difficulty in find-
ing words for emotional feelings or emotion-
al non-expression in the face of  situational 
stressors that clears when stress decreases 
[41]. 
Defense mechanism
Several psychoanalysts advocated that 
alexithymia is ego defense or immature de-
fense mechanism against anxiety and under-
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lying neurotic conflicts [5, 6, 58–60]. On the 
contrary, Krystal argued that alexithymia is a 
defense in a teleological sense only, as it is 
an arrest in affective and cognitive develop-
ment [61]. McDougall reconciled with the 
proposed explanation that defense theory 
and the deficit/developmental arrest theory 
are not mutually exclusive [62, 63]. Her the-
ory depicts alexithymia as a massive defense 
against primitive dreads and overwhelming 
pain rather than neurotic anxieties. Other 
authors perceive alexithymia as  massive de-
fense against intolerable emotions as well as a 
deficit in the mental representation of  emo-
tions, or as a diminished capacity for imagina-
tion and mental representation of  emotions 
[23, 33 ,58, 64].
State and trait features
Empirical findings demonstrate that al-
though alexithymia is a trait, it shows some 
state variation as a reaction to the presence of  
illness [23, 49, 65]. Patients affected by panic 
disorder might resolve the alexithymic reaction 
only after remission when symptom severity 
returned to the premorbid level [66]. This sup-
ports the hypothesis of  alexithymia as a per-
sonality trait with state characteristics which 
wax and wane together [66]. Fonagy P., Bate-
man A., and Bateman A. emphasize that in 
contrast to alexithymia, mentalization is not a 
static and unitary skill or trait but a dynamic ca-
pacity [67]. Several studies have shown lack of  
absolute stability of  alexithymia, although gen-
erally speaking, an individual’s degree of  alex-
ithymia is fairly constant in clinical situations 
and other interpersonal contexts [65, 68, 69].
Instruments developed to assess alexithymia
Since the concept of  alexithymia was in-
troduced as a coherent construct, several re-
searchers have attempted to develop reliable 
and valid instruments for its measuring. Many 
of  observer-rated questionnaires, self-report 
scales, and projective techniques are available, 
but most of  these with poor psychometric 
properties [70]. Haviland has given a detailed 
overview of  the instruments for measure-
ment of  alexithymia by enlisting them as self-
report, structured interview, semi-structured 
interviews, observer reports, projective test, 
and self-report / rater scored [71].
Most researchers agree that clinically ob-
servable features of  alexithymia consist of  
four salient components (restricted imaginal 
process included), even though the widely 
used measurement of  alexithymia, Toronto 
alexithymia scale (TAS-20), consists of  three 
subscales [20]. Vorst and Bermond included 
impaired capacity for experiencing feelings 
of  emotion as the fifth component of  the 
alexithymia concept [72]. Some researchers 
have suggested fantasizing and emotionaliz-
ing as correlates rather than prominent con-
stituents of  the alexithymia construct, while 
others have proposed externally oriented 
thinking (EOT) subscale substantially differ-
ent than difficulty identifying feelings (DIF), 
and difficulty describing feeling (DDF) sub-
scales [73,74]. Some of  these topics were 
explored recently, and it has been suggested 
that restriction of  imaginal capacity might be 
a less salient component of  the alexithymia 
construct [75]. The same study supported 
pensée opératoire as a salient component 
of  the alexithymia construct which might 
be adequately assessed by the EOT subscale 
[75]. For decades, the concept of  alexithymia 
has challenged discussion concerning facets 
that constitute this construct, which is re-
flected in the subscales of  different instru-
ments for measuring alexithymia [29]. Nev-
ertheless, empirical research is challenging to 
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address the complexity of  the multifaceted 
alexithymia construct. Measurement of  alexi-
thymia has been proven as problematic in the 
clinical and nonclinical sample [76].
Some of  the earlier instruments for mea-
suring alexithymia reflect the duality of  theo-
retical perspectives and categorize individu-
als into those with and without alexithymia, 
such as the first instrument for measurement 
of  alexithymia Beth Israel Hospital Psycho-
somatic Questionnaire (BIQ), or interview-
based Diagnostic Criteria for Psychosomat-
ic Research, Alexithymia (DCPR-A) [77]. 
DCPR-A assesses 12 psychosocial syndromes 
clustered into five diagnostic areas, one of  
which is alexithymia with difficulties verbal-
izing and communicating emotional states, 
reduced fantasy, external thinking, physical 
reactions to strong emotions; outburst of  an-
ger, crying, or joy [78]. BIQ, as well as Alexi-
thymia Provoked Response Questionnaire 
(APRQ) and Karolinska Psychodynamic 
Profile (KAPP) are assessment scales to be 
used with an interview [79, 80].
Some authors suggest that self-report 
scales do not reliably assess individuals with a 
high degree of  alexithymia, who may lack the 
introspective capacity to accurately evaluate 
their difficulty in identifying and describing 
subjective feelings [54, 81, 82]. The Shipko 
and Noviello Alexithymia Scale (SNALEX) 
lacks construct validity as a measure of  alexi-
thymia in psychiatric patients [83]. Twenty-
two item MMPI Alexithymia Scale was devel-
oped in Denver from the first 556 items 
derived from Beth Israel Psychosomatic 
Questionnaire (BIQ) and is supposed to have 
more stability over time [84]. Unfortunately, 
MMPI Alexithymia Scale as well as the origi-
nal and revised versions of  the Schalling-Sif-
neos Personality Scale (SSPS)lack validity and 
have poor internal reliabilities [74, 85–87]. 
The Amsterdam Alexithymia Scale (AAS) is a 
self-report questionnaire covering five essen-
tial features of  alexithymia and encompasses 
fantasizing and analyzing emotions [88]. Sif-
neos developed previously mentioned ob-
server-rated BIQ, but with lack of  adequate 
interrater reliability [41, 89]. Following sug-
gestions of  Sriram, Taylor and Bagby devel-
oped a modified version for measuring alexi-
thymia with six items that assess affect 
awareness and six items that assess operative 
thinking [30, 90]. The same authors gave the 
most significant contribution to the develop-
ment of  instruments for measuring alexi-
thymia. Nowadays, Modified-BIQ is used 
only occasionally. Later, they developed the 
Toronto Structured Interview for Alexi-
thymia (TSIA) which is a more reliable meth-
od then self-report question measurement 
[91]. Measuring alexithymia with structured 
interview method assesses the imaginal pro-
cesses, although the items may not adequate-
ly capture wish fulfillment imaginations and 
fantasies, which was the content emphasized 
by Krystal, and Nemiah, Freyberger and Sif-
neos [20, 92]. The TSIA consists of  24 inter-
view questions distributed across four six-
item subscales and includes a separate 
subscale for measuring the fantasizing facet 
over the three facets also assessed by the 
TAS-20 [50]. The TSIA correlates positively 
with the TAS-20 in a variety of  samples [91]. 
Rorschach Reality-Fantasy Scale (RFS) or 
Rorschach Alexithymia Scale (RAS) repre-
sent an alternative method for assessing the 
creation, imaginal capacity and potential 
space between reality and fantasy [93–96]. 
The Scored Archetypal Test (SAT9), similarly 
to Rorschach, uses projective instruments to 
measure the degree of  alexithymia [97]. The 
California Q-set Alexithymia Prototype 
(CAQ-AP), an observer- and a self-report 
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measure of  the alexithymia construct, com-
pares to which extent the alexithymia is de-
termined either by the patient or by an ob-
server [98–100]. Nemiah, who actively 
participated in the construction of  this in-
strument, stated that CAQ-AP seems to pro-
vide the most accurate and complete descrip-
tion of  alexithymia, as it was initially derived 
from clinical observation [71]. Observer 
Alexithymia Scale (OAS) is a self-report ques-
tionnaire to be completed by a subject’s ac-
quaintance or a relative and has 33-items 
based on a five-factor structure: distant, un-
insightful, somatizing, humorless, and rigid 
[101]. Lane and Schwartz proposed a com-
plex hierarchical model of  cognitive-emo-
tional development which can be assessed 
with the self-report instrument Levels of  
Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) [33,102]. 
Although the LEAS may adequately assess 
the levels of  emotional awareness construct 
and the continuum of  increasing cognitive 
complexity, and can also distinguish between 
affective agnosia and anomia, it ‘was not cre-
ated as a measure of  alexithymia per se’ [82], 
and was recently described simply as ‘a per-
formance measure of  the ability to put emo-
tions into words’ [38, 82, 102]. The recent 
meta-analytic review has shown a small over-
lap between LEAS and TAS-20 [103]. The 
self-report Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia 
Questionnaire (BVAQ) was developed to im-
prove assessment of  the salient features of  
alexithymia as a diminution of  fantasy [72]. 
Vorst and Bermond view emotionalizing as a 
fundamental personality dimension that falls 
outside of  the alexithymia construct [72]. 
However, recent network analysis of  the 
BVAQ did not support emotionalizing as a 
distinct component of  the alexithymia con-
struct [29]. Recognizing the limitations of  ex-
isting measures, the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS) was developed with concern for 
empirical and theoretical congruence with 
the alexithymia construct. It encompasses 
five different features of  alexithymia includ-
ing lack of  introspection, social over adapta-
tion, and limited fantasy life together with 
difficulties remembering dreams [104]. Ini-
tially, it had 41 items. Half  of  these items 
were phrased negatively, to compensate an-
swering tendencies and at the end, only 26 
were retained. Fifteen items had to be 
dropped due to low correlations [105]. The 
resulting scale with 26 items comprising the 
TAS was clustered into a four-factor struc-
ture and covered diminished daydreaming 
(supposed to represent a limited fantasy life). 
In the available literature, we have found it as 
the original 26-item TAS whichis still used 
worldwide [104, 106]. In subsequent studies, 
the TAS-26 was found to have some psycho-
metric shortcomings such as social desirabil-
ity, a high number of  items measuring dimin-
ished daydreaming, and low item correlation, 
also the daydreaming factor correlated nega-
tively with the first factor and had  little theo-
retical coherency in the alexithymia construct. 
The authors of  the scale suggest that self-re-
port assessment of  daydreaming activity is 
confounded by a social desirability response 
bias and may not adequately capture the ca-
pacity for imaginal activities [70]. They also 
added that the compositional structure of  
the TAS-26 does not represent the separate 
domains equally. So they decided to develop 
an improved and revised version TAS-R 
where all items assessing daydreaming were 
eliminated [26]. In the first revision, TAS-R 
had 23 items and a two-factor structure with 
DDF and DIF items tending to collapse into 
one single component [70, 105]. In the sec-
ond revision they added 17 new items, and at 
the end, 20 items were included in TAS-20 
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consisting of  three factors DIF, DDF, and 
EOT. It was considered as being indepen-
dent from the socially desirable answers. In 
empirical studies, the TAS-20 is widely used 
as a measurement for alexithymia construct 
because of  its supposed good psychometric 
properties [105,107]. TAS-20 provides a di-
mensional and categorical assessment of  the 
alexithymia features. It incorporates empiri-
cally derived cutoff  scores as well as scores 
ranging from 20 to 100. The TAS-20 has 
been translated into more than twenty lan-
guages and has been cross-validated by con-
firmatory factor analysis in Western, Eastern 
European, East Asian, and Middle Eastern 
countries [108–112]. These findings support 
the view of  alexithymia as a universal trait 
rather than a culture-bound construct. The 
TAS-20 indirectly assesses imaginal process-
ing of  alexithymia by the EOT subscale, even 
though this subscale correlates negatively 
with measures of  fantasy [113, 114]. The 
omission of  an explicit assessment of  imagi-
native processes may produce issues of  
‘noise’ and unreliable responding that is as-
sumed to be associated with the self-report 
method or the weakest point of  a chain of  
TAS-20 measurement [50]. Kooiman, Spin-
hoven, and Trijsburg highlight unsatisfactory 
low internal consistency of  the EOT factor 
and low test-retest reliability for DDF and 
EOT subscales [105]. They also noted that 
TAS-20 assesses some, but not the fantasy as-
pect of  alexithymia. Their opinion is to use 
the TAS-20 in empirical research combined 
with some other instruments for alexithymia 
[105]. Similar viewpoint  have Rokvić and 
Jovanović who suggest a modification of  the 
EOT subscale [115]. Although TAS-20 au-
thors recommend using total TAS-20 scores, 
researchers often calculate total and subtotal 
scores and evaluate all relationships with ex-
ternal correlates [71]. Many studies found 
that the TAS-20 weakly correlated with older 
age, male sex, lower socioeconomic status 
and fewer years of  education [82]. The com-
mon limitations of  the self-report method 
are poor self-insight as alexithymic patients 
usually are not very self-reflective, dissem-
blance and various response styles, as well as 
poor comprehension of  some of  the respon-
dents [105, 116–118]. One of  the possible 
TAS-20 limitations is that highly alexithymic 
individuals cannot accurately assess their def-
icits in affect awareness due to lack of  insight 
[23]. Lane and colleagues added an inherent 
difficulty with the use of  self-reports to mea-
sure, and that is the reason why authors rec-
ommend using more than one method when 
assessing alexithymia [30, 43, 50]. Vanheule 
noted that asking a person if  he or she is un-
aware of  his or her feelings is to a certain ex-
tent paradoxical and therefore, measuring 
alexithymia by self-report is problematic 
[119]. On the other hand, Taylor, Bagby, and 
Parker yielded good results regarding con-
struct validity and endorsed TAS-20 as a valid 
measure of  the alexithymia construct 
[41,107].
Limitations
In this review we focused on the histori-
cal background and theoretical framework 
of  the alexithymia construct and the instru-
ments developed to assess alexithymia. Due 
to the abundance of  theoretical and empirical 
knowledge on the alexithymia construct, we 
could not encompass the genetic and envi-
ronmental/developmental factors in the eti-
ology of  alexithymia, as well as attachment 
theory, childhood trauma and all other fac-
tors that distress the development and af-
fect regulation. We have to acknowledge the 
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common limitations of  narrative versus sys-
tematic literature review as a potentially bi-
ased source and selection of  literature, less 
evidence-based inferences as well as qualita-
tive analysis instead of  quantitative synthesis. 
Conclusion
Alexithymia is not classified as a mental 
disorder in DSM-5. Nevertheless, it is accept-
ed that alexithymia has a negative impact on 
a variety of  somatic and mental health treat-
ments. The recent review ‘The relationship 
between alexithymia and morbidity’  listed 
many somatic and mental disorders and their 
connection with the alexithymia construct 
[120]. Alexithymia is an intriguing topic and 
has generated a large body of  research in the 
past 40 years. Debates about the definition 
and measurement of  alexithymia continue 
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Korijeni aleksitimije
Sažetak - Ovaj pregledni rad predstavlja povijesnu pozadinu i teorijski okvir koncepta te razvoj instrumenata 
koji mjere aleksitimiju. Koncept aleksitimije proizašao je iz kliničkog promatranja, bez prethodno osmišljenog 
teorijskog okvira. Danas je aleksitimija dio kognitivne teorije i teorije regulacije afekta. Aleksitimija je pobudila 
veliko zanimanje psihoanalitičara, kao i kliničara drugih teorijskih usmjerenja. Koncept je nastao iz kliničkih 
iskustava sa psihosomatskim bolesnicima kod kojih je uočen nezadovoljavajući odgovor na psihoterapiju. U 
ovom radu opisujemo razvoj od kategorijskog do dimenzijskog koncepta aleksitimije. Aleksitimija se može 
razumjeti kao obrambeni mehanizam, ali i kao patologija deficita. Preklapa se s konceptom mentalizacije. 
Mogu se razlikovati njene state i trait karakteristike. U završnom dijelu članka navedeni su svi instrumenti za 
mjerenje aleksitimije.
Ključne riječi: aleksitimija, psihoanalitička teorija, psihosomatske bolesti, teorija uma, mentalizacija 
